On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games may not be a robust equilibrium. Our proof reveals that the assumption in global games that the noise errors are independent of the state imposes a non-trivial restriction on incomplete information perturbations.     

On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality

This paper studies ex post individually rational, efficient partnership dissolution in a setting with interdependent valuations. We derive a sufficient condition that ensures the existence of an efficient dissolution mechanism that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility, ex post budget balancedness, and ex post individual rationality. For equal-share partnerships, we show that our sufficient condition is satisfied for any symmetric type distribution whenever the interdependence in valuations is non-positive. This result improves former existence results, demonstrating that the stronger requirement of ex post individual rationality does not always rule out efficiency. We also show that if we allow for two-stage revelation mechanisms, in which agents report their realized payoffs from the allocation, as well as imposing penalties off the equilibrium path, efficient dissolution is always possible even when the interdependence is positive. We further discuss the possibility of efficient dissolution with ex post quitting rights.     

Asymmetry in government bond returns

Is there asymmetry in the distribution of government bond returns in developed countries? Can asymmetries be predicted using financial and macroeconomic variables? To answer the first question, we provide evidence for asymmetry in government bond returns in particular for short maturities. This finding has important implications for modeling and forecasting government bond returns. For example, widely used models for yield curve analysis such as the affine term structure model assume symmetrically distributed innovations. To answer the second question, we find that liquidity in government bond markets predicts the coefficient of skewness with a positive sign, meaning that the probability of a large and negative excess return is more likely in a less liquid market. In addition, a positive realized return is associated with a negative coefficient of skewness, or a small probability of a large and negative return in the future.     

NATURAL DISASTERS,DAMAGE TO BANKS,AND FIRM INVESTMENT

This article investigates the effect of banks’ lending capacity on firms’ investment. To identify exogenous shocks to loan supply, we utilize the natural experiment provided by Japan's Great Hanshin‐Awaji earthquake in 1995. Using a unique data set that allows us to identify firms and banks in the earthquake‐affected areas, we find that the investment ratio of firms located outside the earthquake‐affected areas but having a main bank inside the areas was significantly smaller than that of firms located outside the areas and having a main bank outside the areas. Our findings suggest that loan supply shocks affect firm investment.     

Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations: Potentials and global stability

This paper considers a class of migration dynamics with forward-looking agents in a multi-country solvable variant of the core–periphery model of Krugman [Krugman, P., 1991. Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy 99, 483–499]. We find that, under a symmetric externality assumption, our static model admits a potential function, which allows us to identify a stationary state that is uniquely absorbing and globally accessible under the perfect foresight dynamics whenever the degree of friction in relocation decisions is sufficiently small. In particular, when trade barriers are low enough, full agglomeration in the country with the highest barrier is the unique stable state for small frictions. New aspects in trade and tax policy that arise due to forward-looking behavior are discussed.     

Cumulative offer process is order-independent

This note shows that in the matching-with contracts model, the outcome of the cumulative offer process is order-independent if every hospital has a choice function that satisfies the bilateral substitutability condition and the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition.     

Price leadership in a homogeneous product market

The present paper reexamines the price-setting Stackelberg duopoly with asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions in a homogeneous product market. It demonstrates that in a generic environment, the higher-cost firm is likely to be the price leader. That is, leadership by such a firm is either (a) a unique equilibrium or (b) a payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium in the observable delay game. Thus, while this paper complements and generalizes the findings of recent studies that indicate the possibility of the higher-cost firm’s leadership in homogeneous product markets, it also contrasts with the traditional literature that predicts the dominant-firm price leadership in various environments.     

On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors

This paper studies the impact of a small probability event on strategic behavior in incomplete information games with non-common priors. It is shown that the global impact of a small probability event (i.e., its propensity to affect strategic behavior at all states in the state space) has an upper bound that is an increasing function of a measure of discrepancy from the common prior assumption. In particular, its global impact can be arbitrarily large under non-common priors, but is bounded from above under common priors. These results quantify the different implications common prior and non-common prior models have on the (infinite) hierarchies of beliefs.     

Agricultural policy reforms and WTO commitments on domestic support in Japan

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of Japan＇s agricultural domestic policy since 1995 in the context of the current international negotiations in the WTO Doha Round, which has as one aim further reductions of trade-distorting support among member countries. Apparently, Japan＇s attitude towards agricultural domestic policy reform is one of compliance with the WTO, which requests member countries to reduce their Aggregate Measure of Support （AMS） through trimming trade-distorting （amber box） support and/or transforming traditional-type agricultural subsidies to decoupled-type ones. Japan reduced its amber box support by nearly 80 percent between 1995 and 2000. This drastic reduction is mainly attributable to Japan＇s removal of rice from the amber box in 1998. In addition, following the WTO＇s principle of decoupling, Japan launched an extensive agricultural subsidy reform in 2007. This paper, however, shows the ironical realities of Japanese agricultural policy. Neither a sharp reduction of amber box support nor Japan＇s 2007 reform necessarily means there will be a reduction of trade-distorting effects. On the contrary, the 2007 reform may in fact stimulate domestic rice production.